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COULD NON-USE BE A REASONABLE DECISION REGARD-
ING MODERN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY?
Research paper
Koskinen, Jani ,University of Turku, Turku, Finland, jasiko@utu.fi
Abstract
The non-use of modern technology is commonly seen as a result of incompetence, lack of opportunity
to use technology or the poor design of technology. However, this view lacks sufficient understanding
about the complexity of the issue. This paper considers non-use from the perspective of Heidegger’s
ontological work on being, together with his criticism of modern technology.
This paper is methodologically based on philosophical argumentation. It illustrates how non-use can
be a well-informed choice. Rather than simply accepting modern information and communication
technology as a mandatory part of life, it is possible to create a new and more individual relation with
technology. This paper suggests giving attention to the ontological understanding of being (or ‘self’)
in this digital era rather than blindly following the expectations commonly placed on people by others.
The ontological analysis of being, together with a critical view regarding modern technology, offers a
plausible framework for re-evaluating non-use. Non-use is too commonly approached from an empiri-
cal interpretative perspective; hence, this paper enriches the literature concerning non-use by adopt-
ing a philosophical standpoint. Heidegger’s criticism of technology adds new and fresh insights to the
non-use discourse by illuminating the controlling impact of technology on individuals.
Keywords: Digital society, Heidegger, non-use, essence of technology
1 Introduction
The non-use of computers, mobile devices or digital services is in many cases seen as a result of the
lack of either capacity or opportunity to use such modern information and communication technolo-
gies (ICT) (Sipior, Ward, & Connolly, 2011). The term ‘digital divide’ is commonly used to categorise
people into those who have or do not have access or capability to use ICT although research has
shown that the situation is not really so binary as it is usually perceived (Alexander & Jan, 2013; Neil,
2004; Selwyn, 2004). Further, the poor design of technology, unsuccessful implementation and re-
sistance to change are among the reasons that have been given to non-use or reluctance to use infor-
mation technology (eg. Delone & McLean, 2003; Hirschheim & Newman, 1988; Laumer, Maier,
Eckhardt, & Weitzel, 2016). However, many researchers consider use/non-use to be a more complex
issue than it initially appears (e.g. Cushman & Klecun, 2006; Friemel, 2014; Thorén & Kitzmann,
2015).
It should be noted that the current literature concerning non-use is spread across many disciplines, not
all of which have been regularly connected (Baumer, Ames, Brubaker, Burrell, & Dourish, 2014). The
different approaches used in different studies give rise to questions such as: ‘What social roles might
non-use play? What implicit assumptions about in/appropriateness of technology are evidence by non-
use? Under what conditions does non-use become analytically interesting? What is implied when re-
searchers (or study participants) bother to talk about non-use?’ (Baumer et al., 2014 p.66). Such ques-
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tions show that the topic of non-use requires further investigation about what are hidden rules of using
technology as well as a new approach to question those rules; thus, the present paper contributes by
adopting a different perspective on non-use. Not all non-users are victims of the digital divide or tech-
nophobic, since people may just not want to use technology even if it is well designed and produced.
Haugeland (1982) claimed that we have commonly created and accepted rules – true purposes – for
things. Those rule define what is to be “normal member” of society and create norms that we should
be following. However, a people themselves are in the central role to combine and put different norms
and rules together in specific circumstances – and thus instituting those rules (Haugeland 1982). We,
as people, are good at adopting and making ‘rules’ for things and thus for ourselves. Using infor-
mation technology is conventionally considered normal, whereas non-use is seen as a problematic ab-
normality that needs to be addressed (Selwyn, 2003). Mobile phones offer a good example of this. Ini-
tially, we did not know how to act with them, but then we started to create rules for using such devices
‘properly’, even though those rules are divergent and alternating (see Allred & Crowley, 2017;
Forgays, Hyman, & Schreiber, 2014; Lipscomb, Totten, Cook, & Lesch, 2007). Nowadays, it is a
commonly accepted norm that it is impolite to use a mobile phone during dinner or, even more so, dur-
ing a funeral – unless the person being contacted is, for example, a surgeon who is required to save
someone’s life. However, other normal way of acting in relation to a mobile phone is that one is ex-
pected to answer a call or at least return it as soon as possible.
Instead of sticking to the dualistic premise of incapable non-user and capable user we should begin to
look at other option: there may be people who just do not want to use modern technology or some as-
pects of it, despite their capacity or opportunity to do so – because they have some personal reason for
it. There are examples in the literature of people being against the use of digital technology and digital
media due to reasons not dependent on capacity (Hutchins, 2016) as well as some studies that seek to
differentiate new kinds of digital exclusion (Helsper & Reisdorf, 2016). However, technology seems
to have become an imperative, with the problems associated with technology being resolved by adding
more technology, which results in the creation of the illusion that we are mastering the world
(Petrakaki, 2017).
The difference between the contexts of personal and organisational use lies in the fact that in the or-
ganisational context, technology use can be mandatory and subject to more strict rules, whereas in
one’s personal life technology use is more voluntary and subject to the social rules of different kind as
‘commonly accepted’ ways of behaving. In this paper, we focus on the personal use of technology alt-
hough it is recognised that the boundary between personal and organisational use in many cases is on-
ly a fine line. In the end, it is people’s individual existence and their experience that creates the deep-
est framework, and that is where the focus of this paper lies. Thus, the aim of this article is to present
an alternative perspective showing how non-use or use can be an outcome of very personal insights,
that is, motives of an individual to have a different relationship towards the overwhelming technology.
In addition, this paper looks for the work of Heidegger to see if non-use could be the meaningful way
to cope with modern technology and understand it effect on us.
Heidegger was chosen for use in this paper because of his work on existentialism and his criticism of
technology (Heidegger, 1927, 1977). These aspects of his work are particularly relevant in an era
characterised by the phenomenon of technology invading every facet of life. Information technology
has become part of our everyday lives and we use our mobile devices throughout the day, every day.
Our societies can be described as (information) technological and online ones – at least in the first
world. Information technology is beginning to have a profound effect on people’s psyches as well as
on society as a whole, since technology is becoming pervasive in everyday life (Walters & Kop,
2009). Indeed, it represents a catalyst that is changing our society and altering our commitments to
others (Fernando, 1998). Not all people are willing to let this situation – where technology is integrat-
ed as an inseparable part our life – become the status quo.
The non-use of digital technologies cannot be treated as mere incompetence or technophobia, but is
instead a much wider and complex issue with other reasons behind it (see Kleine, Light, & Montero,
2012; O?Driscoll, Timms, Brough, & Sawang, 2010; Wagenknecht, 2017). A Heideggerian view on
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technology and his work on hermeneutic phenomenology provides a framework for understanding
why non-use can be based on a very well-informed understanding about technology and a deliberate
choice based on that understanding.
In Chapter 2, we look at Heidegger’s view what is the essence of technology and what are the conse-
quences of it. In Chapter 3, we look deeper what being means in the digital world of ours. In Chapter
4, we start to look a new way of being in the digital world – home-like-being-in-the-digital-world –
that would be more human and beautiful for us. Finally, in Chapter 5, we end up with the conclusion.
2 Heidegger and essence of technology
Heidegger’s work can be seen as a strong ontological basis of considering the meaning of digitalisa-
tion for our society as well as for the life choices of individuals. We should see use and non-use as a
continuum that is based on different factors and is capable of changing over time instead of creating
separate classes into which we try to fit people. The sentiment of this paper seems to run parallel to
Selwyn’s (2003) concern about a too strict dichotomy between non-users and users – which seems
even more apparent today than it was a decade ago – even if the methodology used is different.
Heidegger (1977) was critical of modern technology due to its nature or ‘essence’. To him, the essence
of technology is not technological in a sense that it is commonly perceived: a mere instrument or tool
for some purpose. Instead, he claimed that as long as we think that way, we are mastered by the tech-
nology and its essence. We may start looking for answers and ask ‘what is technology?’, but by asking
this question, we already accept the notion of technology that Heidegger (1977, p. 288) called the in-
strumental and anthropological definition. This definition noted by Heidegger includes the idea of
technology as used by people as a means to an end (instrumental notion) as well as being part of a hu-
man activity we perform (anthropological notion). As Heidegger (1977, p. 288) showed in his clause
‘Who would ever deny that it is correct?’, this instrumental and anthropological definition seems to be
indisputable at first sight.
Nevertheless, there is a clear problem with this instrumental and anthropological view. Even if a cer-
tain description is correct, it does not mean that it is the whole truth. Instead, it may be just one aspect
of a multidimensional issue, which is the case here. This instrumental view of technology thus does
not reveal the essence of technology. The essence of technology is revealing.
It reveals something about our human nature and how we as human beings relate to technology. We
want to gain and maintain control or mastery over technology.(Heidegger 1977) We can exhibit an
iron will and a clear aim to use it as a means to serve our ends. However, in many cases we seem to
lose that mastery over technology. After losing control, we start to seek to regain control over it more
and more determinedly. This result stems from the position whereby we do not see the essence of
technology. We are used to looking at it only through the instrumental and anthropological perspec-
tives – technological determinism that is correct but does not present the whole picture
Thus, the essence of technology is more akin to a worldview or way of living than a mere tool or tech-
nological development as it is portrayed for us. Yet, what is meant by a worldview or way of living
when talking about what the essence of technology is? It means that technological view has set the
game board of our life we live and playing by the rules, those commonly accepted rules (see Hauge-
land, 1982) of which we are not fully and consciously aware. People use technology in their everyday
lives and this trend is constantly escalating, but still people do not understand what technology does
for us at the existential level as we do not see the essence of technology. We simply use technology
because it is available and because society expects people to use it.
How often do we really think about what technology actually means to us and what impact it has in
our lives? Even when we give thought to such issues, those thoughts are usually quite facile, occasion-
al and buried under everyday concerns. Thus, the technological way of living appears self-evident and
our world is revealed to us through the frames of the essence of technology. The essence of technology
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provides us with the values of never-ending development that reveals everything – including humans –
as standing-reserve (Gestell) (see Heidegger, 1977). Standing-reserve is a mode of revealing that sees
objects as ready to be used or ordered. Heidegger’s river – Rhone – example illustrates this well: a
river before modern technology was a river like the Rhone. However, through a power plant, modern
technology – that was installed – reveals the Rhone to be a source of energy that can be used, stored
and ordered. This kind of revealing is like a never-ending story – it reveals the target as standing re-
serve for technological determinism that aims to identify new ways to use it (Heidegger, 1977).
Sinnerbrink (2006) offered an excellent description how technology is transforming the actual to be-
come a standing reserve:
‘The computer is an information interface, the mobile telephone a “personalized” communication re-
source on permanent standby; we ourselves become communication resources permanently “on-call”
within social, electronic, and economic networks.’
Hence, the actual is transformed into an object of measurement and evaluation. Finally, the actual – as
the Rhone or human beings – are changed so that they can be used for some purpose – to be ordered
when needed and efficiency way, like resources “should” be. People using, for example, social media
are changed into resources that are diagnosed, classified and used for economic purposes by compa-
nies that offer those services. Another good example is human resource management. Humans are
seen as a resource that should be managed in order to become more profitable or efficient. When diffi-
cult times arrive, people are outsourced or made redundant based on economic factors – they are less-
ened by revealing them as the essence of technology does – people are sees as standing reserve for the
company.
As Wyatt (2003) pointed out, if we focus solely on the users of technology, we neglect other aspects of
people.  They are  actors who shape and negotiate meanings for technology. She further noted that the
importance of users in technological development is known and emphasised although it also contains a
problem – as by focusing on use we accept the promises of technology, capitalist relations of its pro-
duction and also common user paths towards the acceptance of technologies (sooner or later)(Wyatt
2003).
Digital technology does the same for humans as a power plant does for the Rhone: it allows humans
(users) to be available when needed (ready to order), boosts their efficiency (serving the never-ending
development) and diminishes them as part of a digital society (standing-reserve) instead of respecting
them as an actual and special kind of beings – human beings. Even when the need to limit technology
use is recognised, it is commonly based of the essence of technology – the efficiency or performance is
lacking (see Tarafdar, Pullins, & Ragu-Nathan, 2015; Tarafdar, Tu, & Ragu-Nathan, 2010).
It is alarming to consider that this is what the essence of technology is and that it will not change
through our will. It does not matter whether the use of technology is rejected or praised – both of these
choices are made due to technology. Nevertheless, as Heidegger stated, there is still hope: ‘There was
a time when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was called techne. The poiesis of the fine
arts was also called techne’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 315p. 339). We can begin to look for beautiful and
deeper things rather than mere efficiency, financial benefit and the objectification of everything. As
Riis (2011) stated, if we want to challenge the technological revealing of things as standing reserve,
we should not concentrate on revolutionising our technology because we cannot change its essence.
Instead, we should revise our human existence, which is the focus of the next section.
Concentrating on one’s life and one’s existence may represent a valid reason for individuals to choose
to be non-users: people who want to look for the beautiful in their lives and distract themselves from
the invasion of digital technology, to exist as an individual who seeks understanding about themselves
and tries to find the deeper meaning of their life in this digitalised world. As Heidegger (1977) did not
provide a concrete answer regarding what art he was talking about, we need to consider his earlier
work in order to continue our quest to understand the non-use or use of technology and make the sense
of it. In this way, we can try to find a new and different relationship with technology rather than being
dominated by its essence.
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3 Being in the digital world
The next question concerning the use/non-use of modern technologies is: what is the role of digitalisa-
tion in one’s personal life and what does it mean for one’s existence? This is particularly important
when we consider the aforementioned danger of the essence of technology. As we are approaching this
question from a Heideggerian perspective, we need to look deeper into what it means to be a human
being. For Heidegger, the question about being (especially being human) was a journey towards deep
and permanent investigation. The fundamental aspect of this existential ontology is the distinction be-
tween the human way of being and the being of things (Sandberg & Pinnington, 2009). The human
way of being is a central issue that must be understood in order to achieve our aim of identifying the
basis of non-use.
However, Heidegger did not offer a strict and explicit answer to the question of being in Being and
Time – because the project was never fully completed. Instead, he attempted to clarify the question
from different perspectives, emphasising the individual comprehension of the idea that only the people
themselves can understand their Dasein (being-in-the-world) (see Heidegger, 1927).
Dasein is the central term that Heidegger (1927) used to describe human existence that is aware and
confronts its own being in this world. Dasein is a mode of being that is different from every other
mode of being. It is essential to understand that there are three primary modes of being presented in
Being and Time, namely ready-to-hand, present-at-hand and Dasein. It is notable that for Heidegger
being is based on hermeneutical phenomenology and – in simple terms – this means that being can
only be investigated from the first-person perceptive. This is why there are only three main modes of
being.
The ready-to-hand and present-at-hand are modes that are possible to all objects but third is the mode
of being that is possible for human1 only. The first mode we look closer is ready-to-hand (zuhanden-
heit). Heidegger’s (1927) hammer example provides some insight into how best to approach the de-
scription of ready-to-hand. Heidegger explained that something is ready-to-hand if it has some pur-
pose to accomplish – as a hammer is used for some purpose. Usually, we do not give much considera-
tion to the objects we use; we simply use them as we have always used them. We see that they are
there, ready for us to use to accomplish some goal, but without active reflection on the object we are
using. Thus, we use such objects in the way they are meant to be used or as is proper to use them, such
as how a computer is used to write an article. The problem is that, for example, mobile technology is
ready-to-hand all the time: social media, remote work tools, leisure applications, search engines etc.
This renders it a double-edged sword. Electronic devices allow us to communicate, learn and entertain,
but at the same time they bind us to technology through reward-related processes and may even alter
our basic cognitive functioning (Wilmer & Chein, 2016). All of this occurs imperceptibly because
technology is always ready-to-hand and we are used to using it.
The second mode of being that we look is present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). It can be seen as a situa-
tion wherein we start to view an object consciously and therefore begin to see it more deeply. If one
compares this approach to ready-to-hand, which focuses on the use of an object for some aim rather
than on the object itself, one can see the power of present-at-hand. It is concerned with how we con-
centrate and challenge ourselves and thus begin to see more. This is very similar to how scientists typ-
ically do their work – focusing on an object and gaining information about it. Another example of this
is a situation wherein an object comes under investigation because it is broken. The item that was
ready for use (ready-to-hand) is not usable anymore and thus it is looked at thoroughly. By means of
its brokenness, the object comes into the sight of the observer. People who experience the failure of
modern technology could see how dependent they are on such technology (especially mobile devises)
1Unless we found other species or mode of intelligence that has such capacity for self-reflection than humans does
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as well as the degree to which its presence changes their behaviour (see Salehan & Negahban, 2013;
Shalini, Lulu, Jamie, & Miao, 2014).
The third mode of being is Dasein, which could also be translated as ‘the individual human mode of
being in the world’ although there are many other ways to grasp and present the meaning of the origi-
nal German term. However, the special character of Dasein compared to the other two modes of being
is that Dasein refers to only that which can have an understanding about its own being and hence can
investigate it. Thus, Dasein is also about understanding one’s own being in the world, that is, the mode
of being only – according to our current knowledge – possible for human beings (van der Hoorn &
Whitty, 2015). This understanding about one’s existence is the key factor that separates Dasein from
present-at-hand and especially from ready-to-hand. Dasein can see the present-at-hand and the ready-
to-hand, but Dasein cannot truly be reached as present-at-hand or as ready-to-hand. Thinks can be
present or ready but only Dasein (human) can see other modes and give meanings for those.
The problem inherent in a digital society is that we are expected to live a digital life and take every-
thing that technology gives us as it is ready-to-hand. We should use social media, internet banking and
mobile devices. In addition, governmental services are transferring into a digital format, for example,
healthcare is now subject to digitalisation and voting is becoming electronic. Behind this digitalisation
is the aim of making services faster, more cost effective and reliable, etc. – to fulfil the aforementioned
essence of technology.
Digitalisation is something that we are all expected to adapt to, which means that we should be like all
the others – das Man. Das Man is a term that Heidegger (1927) used to describe a situation wherein
people consciously choose to hide or lose themselves and replace themselves with commonly accepted
ways of being or acting, whereas Dasein is concerned with living a life consciously and making the
sense of one’s own, authentic life. The use of digital technologies can have negative consequences to
people and their personal life goals, even when the technology could prove very helpful for most of us.
It depends on people’s personal backgrounds (see thrownness in Heidegger, 1927). This paper aims to
help see the digital world that is ready-to-hand in the mode of present-at-hand where people – as
Dasein – may seek the new ways to be in this world.
4 Thrownness and the search for homelike-being-in-the-digital-
world
Heidegger’s (1927) Dasein includes the notion of thrownness2 (Geworfenheit), which means that we
are thrown into this (digital) world we live in. We are born in this world along with our biological and
social background. We have our genes, a specific premise that has a significant impact on our lives
together, with the socio-economic environment and history of ours. Our history and background is fact
that we cannot change, but it gives meaning to this present time by giving the circumstances and re-
strictions that we are facing with our thrownness.
Thus, Dasein is nowadays situated within the digital world, in the midst of what is there by means of
thrownness, which incorporates the embodiment of Dasein (Overgaard, 2004). This thrownness of
Dasein can be seen as the position from which we should start to analyse digitalisation and the use or
non-use decision from a Heideggerian perspective. We are here and need to live this life, but we still
have the potential to confront how we want to live it. The importance of thrownness is underlined if
we look at it from a technological perspective. We are born in this world along with our historical,
socio-economical and personal background, and this gives us the point of departure from where we
need to begin to look for what we truly want from our lives in this digital world.
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Heidegger meant that we are thrown into some situation in this world with a certain precondition and
that is indeed an undeniable fact – we cannot change history. This is the situation we have to live in
and deal with by ourselves. We are sensemaking creatures because sensemaking is what we do and we
cannot stop doing it even if we should or want to (see Withy, 2014). Even if we decide to stop sense-
making by dying, this would actually involve performing sensemaking in a way during the decision
and the act itself, and thus it is as inseparable part of being a human being. Sensemaking is the most
basic starting point as well as the most fundamental dimension of our thrownness. It is a burden laid
upon us and we are bound by it. However, it is not a personal burden although it is essential and exis-
tential in the way that we are stuck with it (Withy, 2014). Our relationship with world is unquestioned
habit where we are making sense with already existing orders, standards and skills that are associated
with shared use language. But Heidegger noted that sense is extended beyond habituated framing. We
should not only ask “what?” but investigate world with the non-instrumentality, mood and by being
open. (Holt & Cornelissen, 2013) We are all here in this world and we have to make the sense of it by
ourselves. We cannot choose what we are born with and thrownness portrays that quite well. Regard-
less, this life is mine and I have to live it until the day I die. Only I can find the meaningfulness in it.
However, I can neglect or hide my awareness of my possibilities by agreeing to live as all others do –
das Man (see Heidegger, 1927). As mentioned above, das Man is the mode of being whereby people
consciously choose to hide or lose themselves by replacing their Dasein with the generally accepted
and non-disturbing way of being. According to Heidegger, however, we should not be satisfied with
this way of living.
Instead of losing our life under the spell of everyone else (das Man), we should find meaningfulness
by ourselves through seeking the beautiful and all the possibilities for it in our life. The aim is that we
should feel we are homelike here in this world we all live in. Homelike-being-in-the-world is a term
coined by Svenaeus (2001), which describes health in a Heideggerian way. Homelike-being-in-the-
world is to be whole, to have an attuned understanding and the capacity to act, and to have a meaning
in being in this world with the self as well as others.
Health as homelike-being-in-the-world is seen as a solid solution for healthcare information systems in
modern society because it emphasises the individual (patient) experience of one’s own life rather than
focusing on the biomedical side (Koskinen, 2010, 2016, 2019). Nevertheless, we could develop the
term into the context of this paper. The new version could be homelike-being-in-the-digital-world. We
should confront expectations that are laid upon us by others, seek to move beyond those and look for a
relation with technology that is suitable of us – a relation that is homelike and beautiful for us.
5 Conclusion
Heidegger’s description of the essence of technology and the danger it poses to us enables us to see the
risks inherent in our digital world and recognise that we should start to critically consider our relation
to it. We can see that technology is surrounding us at an ever increasing rate and that every moment
we became more and more dependent on it even if we believe ourselves to be the masters of technolo-
gy.
In the first section of this article, a question was raised: what is the relation between technology, indi-
vidual(s), society and common rules when people decide on non-use?
Thus, non-use can be seen as a way of coping with invading technologies. Some people are starting to
criticise the values and expectations of our modern society. There are trends such as downshifting,
slow food, slow tech, declining to watch television, going back to analogic music etc. All these can be
seen as phenomena that show people are not happy with how we currently use technology. Life under
the essence of technology is hectic and it reveals everything to be an exploitable resource or, as
Heidegger would put it, a standing reserve. Hence, there are people who do not want to take technolo-
gy for granted or use it like others do, but who instead try to reconstruct their relation with technology
in a different, individual and beautiful way. This new relation can be derived from Heidegger even
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though he did not provide a proper answer but rather only an obscure idea of arts as promising power
over technology.
However, even if we cannot change the essence of technology, we can change the role that technology
has for us as individuals. We are the being – Dasein – that possesses the capacity to confront our ex-
istence and contemplate it. We can analyse the meaning of technology for ourselves and for our being
here. We can refuse to use technology as we are expected to and instead search for a way of living that
makes sense for us. When people reflect on their own being as Dasein – instead of das Man, which
can be seen as a manifestation of the average member of society – they can find their own paths for
their lives and forge their way of living in this digital wold. Hence, it seems that the relation between
technology, society and common rules lies in that they are outside factors influencing individuals
through their existence. However, individuals create meaning inside of their minds for those outside
factors and determine whether they have value – positive or negative – for individual life. Neverthe-
less, this does not mean that we do not care about society – other people – or abandon it. Instead we
should start to look out the more human approach to society where technology does not define us but
how we define technology from our human perspectives.
It appears that the non-use of technology could have a solid philosophical basis, grounded on
Heidegger, and thus a personal rationale behind it. After all, this is my life and I should be choosing
how to live it, since when I die I will face it not as das Man but as Dasein. There is a need for a new
relationship with technology that is founded on the terms of individuals rather than on the terms un-
critically adopted by society. However, this means that essence of technology is challenged and non-
use – even if not fully but partially – may be one way to carry out new relationship
The Heideggerian approach is obviously not the only means of explaining non-use, but it is a new and
thus enriching one for this topic. Heidegger’s thoughts – even if they may seem obscure at times –
force us to concentrate on the issue of digitalisation and provide us with the possibility to find new and
personal views of the landscape of the digital world that we may want to live in – or flee from.
In the end, it is better to be able to look back at the time of death and say: ‘It is sad to give up this life
of mine. It may not be a perfect one but it was mine and mine only.’ The reason for this claim stems
from the question of what really matters in the end, people or technology. If you were asked, ‘if you
were to die tomorrow, would you like to spend your time being with people face to face or through
technology’ what would you answer? If you are likely  to answer that you would rather spend time
face to face with people, then you should question why you currently prefer technology and establish
your own individual relation with technology. Is it the essence of technology or art3 that is guiding
you?
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